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Chapter 8

Improving C2 Effectiveness
Based on Robust Connectivity
S. Deller
Textron Defense Systems, USA
A. Tolk
Sim/S Incorporated, USA & Old Dominion University, USA
G. Rabadi
Old Dominion University, USA
S. Bowling
Bluefield State College, USA

ABSTRACT
This chapter describes an approach to develop an improved metric for network effectiveness through the
use of Cares' (2005) Information Age Combat Model (/ACM) as a context for combat (or competition)
between networked forces. The /ACM highlights the inadequacy of commonly used quantifiable metrics
with regards to comparing networks that differ only by the placement of a f ew links. An agent-based
simulation is used to investigate the potential value of the Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue ().PFE) as an
indicator ofnetwork effectiveness. The results validate this assumption. Another measurement is proven
to be equally important, namely the robustness ofa configuration. Potential applications from the domain
of ballistic missile defense are included to show operational relevance.

INTRODUCTION
The application of network theory enables us to
investigate alternatives to the traditional hierarchical organizations of Command and Control (C2)
processes and systems. Traditional hierarchical
organizations were the result of centralized command and control cultures and the significant

costs, both in time and money, of distributing the
necessary information to enable sound decisionmaking. The increased desire for peer-to-peer
negotiation and self-synchronization and the
incredible reduction in these costs during the past
decade has made non-hierarchical organizations
viable alternatives. It also introduced a significant

DOI: I0.4018/978-1-4666-6058-8.chOO&

Copyng hl ID 2014, !GI Gluhal Copying or d1stnh u1mg in prin t or electronic fur~ wi1hou1 wriucn pcrmhSton of IGI Glo!>&l 1s proh,hitcd.

Improving C2 Effectiveness Based on Robust Connectivity

challenge: what should we measure to determine
which organization can be more effective?
The effectiveness of a C2 network is more
than just the sum of its nodes and arcs, which
can be measured by the link-to-node ratio (l/N).
A maximally-connected network, where every
node is connected to every other node (i.e., l =
(N-1 )!), not only remains prohibitive io monetary
cost; it is undesirable due to the inability of a
node to manage or process the overwhelming
information flow represented by the arcs. However, a minimally-connected network may not be
desirable due to either insufficient capability or
capacity or an increased vulnerability of the network. Additionally, the link-to-node ratio metric
cannot discriminate between alternative network
organizations that have the same numbers ofnodes
and links, but differ solely in their arrangement.
The mere counting of a link does not account for
its significance, or lack thereof.
The degree distribution metric is a measurement of whether the number of links connected
to each node is uniformly distributed throughout
a network. Adaptive, complex networks have a
small number of highly connected nodes (i.e.,
a skewed degree distribution). Such highly connected nodes can be clustered together or can be
distanced from each other, and is expressed as a
clustering coefficient calculated from the proportion of a node's direct neighbors that are also
direct neighbors of each other. This represents a
measurement of a network's cohesion and selfsynchronization. The characteristic path length
is a related metric, and is measured as the median
of the mean of the lengths of all the shortest paths
in the network. While these metrics begin to account for link significance, they are insufficient
indiscriminating between networkconfigurations
that vary in the placement of just a single link.
Jain and Krishna (2002) introduced the relationship between the Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue
(1,,PFE) ofa graph and its autocatalytic sets, and used
graph topology to study various network dynamics. Cares (2005) employed a similar approach

to describe combat (or competition) between
distributed, networked forces or organizations.
His Information Age Combat M odel (IACM)
focused on the "-PFE as a measure of the ability
of a network to produce combat power. Cares
proposed that the greater the value of the "i>FE'
the greater the effectiveness of the organization
of that networked force.
Deller, et al (2009, 2012) confirmed this proposal by constructing an agent-based simulation
that enabled networked organizations to compete
against each other in the context of Cares' IACM.
The results of the agent-based simulation indicated that the value of the APFE was a significant
measurement of the performance of a networked
force. However, the effectiveness of the "-P£·E
measurement was dependent on the existence of
unique "-PFE values for the configurations under
consideration. When alternative organizations
had a shared "rr-E value, additional measurements
were required to enable discrimination. Of the
additional metrics considered, robustness proved
the most effective io improving the value of the
APFE as a quantifiable metric of network performance. Ultimately, the best indicator of network
effectiveness was a metric that combined both the
\FE and robustness values.

THE INFORMATION AGE
COMBAT MODEL
Cares designed the lACM to facilitate his investigation into bow a networked force organizes. It is
not intended to be a combat simulation or a tool to
test weapon platforms. Instead, the basic objects of
the IACM are generic nodes defined by the simple
functions they perform, not by any performance
specifications they were built or designed to. For
example, Sensor nodes receive signals about observable phenomena of other nodes in the model.
The types of signals received are not relevant;just
that the Sensor"sensed" something about that node
and passed that information on to a Decider node.
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Decider nodes direct the actions of other nodes in
the model. Likewise, the types of actions are not
relevant;just that those othernodes take direction
from that particular Decider (i.e., fall within that
Decider's "command and control"). Nodes that
interact with otber nodes to affect the state of those
nodes are called Influencer~. Again, the types of
interactions are not relevant, just that tbey may
occur. Finally, those nodes that can be acted upon,
but perform no sensing, deciding, or influencing
functions are included as Target nodes. For the
purpose of this discussion, all nodes belong to
one of two opposing sides, conventionally termed
BLUE and RED.
The links that connect these nodes represent the
various physical and communicative interactions
between them. Since these nodes perform a single
function (e.g., "sense, "direct." etc.), information
flow between the nodes is necessary for activity
to occur, and generally takes the form ofa combat
cycle (see PigureFigure 1). In its simplest form, this
cycle consists of a Sensor detecting an opposing
node and passing that information co the Sensor's
controlling Decider. The Decider may then direct
one of its assigned Influencers to initiate action
on the opposing node, such as exerting physical
force, psychological or social influence, or some
other form of influence. The effect of this action
is subsequently detected by the Sensor and the
cycle may be repeated until the desired outcome
has been achieved. While the four links forming
this cycle are just a small subset of the all the possible node-to-node permutations, they collectively
represent the most important activity in the model
and are the focus of this study.
AU links in the model are directional, and have
different meanings depending on which nodes
they go "from" and "to". For example, a link
from a Decider to any friendly node (whether it
be a Sensor, Influencer, Target or other Decider)
represents the conveyance of the Decider's direction (such as engagement or repositioning), but
the links from an opposing Sensor and Influencer
represent the Decider being detected and acted
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Figure 1. Basic combat cycle

upon. Some links have two meanings, such as
those from an Influencer to an opposing Sensor.
These links represent two different interactions:
detection and engagement. Both interpretations
are valid and the context of the model will make
clear which is intended.
Other links have ambiguous meanings, such as
those connecting Sensors of the same side. These
can be defined as either the Sensors detecting each
other or coordinating with each other. Links from
a Sensor to other Sensors, Influencers, or Targets
of the same side can be defined direct coordination but are not included in this discussion as it
is assumed that the information detected must be
routed through a friendly Decider. Additionally,
links from an Influencer to other nodes ofthe same
side represent fratricide and are notincluded either.
A collection of nodes and links can be described though the application of graph theory
(Chartrand, 1984). A concise description of any
graph is provided by the adjacency matrix A, in
which the row and column indices represent the
nodes, and the matrix elements are either one or
zero according to the rule: A.=
1' if there exists a
JJ
link from node i to node j and A,i =0, otherwise.
Consequent!y, each unique network configuration
of nodes and links has a unique mathematicallyequivalent matrix portrayal. This enables the application of mathematical tools to analyze these
networks, such as the Perron-Frobenius theorem.
This theorem guarantees the existence of a real,
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positive principal (maximum) eigenvalue of A y.
if AQ is an irreducible nonnegative matrix. Since
all the nodes on each side are connected to all the
opposing Sensor and Influencer nodes, the matrix
is strongly connected and, therefore, irreducible.
This eigenvalue, 11.PFE' is a measure of the selective
connectivity within the network (i.e., networks
with the same number of links may have different \FE values depending on the placement of the
links). The full range of mathematical values for
a 11,rFE of any adjacency matrix goes from 0 (for
a network with no links at all) to n, where n =
the total number of nodes (for a maximally connected network). Clearly, the 11,PFE is a quantifiable
metric with which to measure the different ways
to organize a networked force.
The 11.PFE is a !so an indicator of the effectiveness
of that network's organization. This was determined through the construction of an agent-based
simulation representing the IACM and the conduct
of a series offorce-on-force engagements to investigate the correlation of each opposing network's
¾FE value with its corresponding probability of
winning the engagement (Deller, etal, 2012). The
opposing forces had equal assets and capabilities,
but differed in their connectivity arrangements
(i.e., where the links existed). These differences
in connectivity often, but not necessarily, lead to
unequal 11,PFE values.
The consideration of different ¾FE values for
the opposing forces reflects the first challenge
in modeling the IACM. The IACM as originally
described by Cares (2005) uses a single adjacency
matrix to reflect the collective nodes and links of
both BLUE and RED forces. This is sufficient
when focusing on one side's organizational effectiveness while holding the other side constant.
But BLUE and RED are each seeking separately to
maximize their own organizational effectiveness,
while at the same time minimizing the organizational effectiveness of the opposing force. This
dynamic interaction cannot be accounted for with
a single 11.rFE value, so we calculate separate values
(A8LuE and ¾ED) to measure the potential effectiveness of each opposing configuration independent

of the asset arrangement of the opposing force.
Note, however, that these calculations required
the adjacency matrices include a Target node
to enable the complete depiction of any combat
cycles the network configurations may contain.
Any Target nodes included will be linked to all
opposing Sensors (to enable potential detection)
and Influencers (to enable potential action). While
the number of Target nodes included affects the
¾FE value, it does so because of the additional
volume of nodes and Jinks, not because of a difference in their configuration. Consequently, the
use of a single Target node representative of all
the enemy forces capable of being targeted can
be assumed in order to focus on the aspect of the
network that determines the 11,PFE: value ordering.
The agent-based paradigm was utilized for this
purpose because the resulting models provide both
the ability to account for small unit organization
and the autonomy of action that was necessary
for our investigation. An additional advantage of
utilizing an agent-based simulation was the ability
to work around the ambiguities of link interpretation in the IACM described earlier. For details on
the construct of the agent-based simulation see
Deller, et al (2012).
The design of this experiment was intended
to isolate the effect of the 11,PFE value by keeping
as many variables between the forces as equal or
constant as possible. The opposing forces consisted of the same number of Sensors, Deciders,
and Influencers, differing only in how they were
arranged (i.e., linked). Within each force, the
numbers of Sensors and lofluencers were equal
to preclude any bias towards configurations that
have more of one or the other, because the potential value of a Sensor may not truly equal the
potential value of an Influencer. Consequently,
the composition of each force followed an X-YX-1 (Sensor-Decider-Influencer-Target) template,
with the sole target being representative of all the
opposing nodes. Additionally, the performance
capabilities of all Sensor and Influencer nodes
within the agent-based simulation were identical
(i.e., the sensing range equaled the influencing
179
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range, and the speeds of movement for both types
of nodes were the same).
The goal of this experiment was to gain a "first
order" understanding of the IACM, therefore two
key scoping decisions were made. First, each
Sensor and Influencer would only be connected
to one Decider (but any given Decider could be
connected to multiple Sensors and Influencers).
Second, theconnectivitywithin any X-Y-X-1 force
was limited to only those links necessary to create
combat cycles (i.e., Target to Sensor, Sensor to
Decider, Decider to Influencer, and Influencer to
Target). Thesearetheessenceofthe).,PFE_ Whereas
the other link types can significantly enhance both
the "-PFE value and the performance of any given
network configuration, the present model provides
a baseline for assessing what the potential effects
of that inclusion may be.
There are many ways in which nodes can be
connected for specific values of X and Y. The
number of possible configurations grows rapidly
even for small values. Consider a tiny network
consisting of three Sensors and three Influencers
distributed between two Deciders. There are only
four different permutations of the allocation of
these Sensors and Influencers between these Deciders. However, because the nodes of the IACM
are generic two of these four permutations are, in

effect, isomorphic and therefore can be excluded
(i.e., the only meaningful difference between these
two possible configurations is whether the Decider
that is linked to two Sensors is the same Decider
that is linked to two Influencers. While this 50%
reduction in combinations to be considered is
trivial for this tiny network, it quickly becomes
a crucial step in reducing the search space of the
problem. Considering a slightly larger force of
just five Sensors and five Influencers allocated
across threeD eciders yields 36 different permutations which, fortunately, can be reduced to eight
meaningfully different configurations by applying
the same logic.
As the size ofthe force is increased it is obvious
that the contrast between the number of possible
configurations and the number of meaningfully
different configuratio ns becomes extremely large
very quick!y. This disparity is further compounded
by the comprehensive design of the experiment,
where each configuration was tested against every
possible configuration. Since a 7-3-7- 1 network
has 42 meaningfully different configurations this
required 1,764 (i.e., 422) unique engagements. Had
we not reduced the search space, we this would
.have required 50,625 (Le., 2252) unique engage•
ments. The numbers of meaningfully different
configurations for all X·Y-X-1 forces wbereX <

Table I . The numbers ofmeaningfully different configurations ofall X-Y-X-1 networked forces where X
< 11 and Y < 8
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11 and Y < 8 based on the unique values for the
distributions of Sensors and Influencers across
the Deciders are summarized in Table 1.
As previously mentioned, each of these configurations bas a unique adjacency matrix that represents the connectivity, or lack thereof, between
each of the nodes. If we segment the adjacency
matrix into parts by grouping the types of nodes
together (as depicted in FigureFigure 2), we see
that 14 of the 16 sections (the shaded areas in
the figure) are homogenous, i.e. either all "1" or
"O," due to the absolute absence or existence of
any links between those types of nodes. The two
unshaded sections reflect the connectivity of each
Sensor and Influencer to and from a particular
Decider, and vary by configuration based on the
allocation of Sensors and Influencers across the
Deciders. The effect of this near uniformity is to
constrain the variance between the \FE values to
just a narrow portion of the full range of possible

\.'E values. lo the example case of a 7-3-7 -1 network the full range of possible "'rrt: values varies
betwee n O (no connections) and 18 (maximally
connected), but the actual range of A.P~E values
for the 42 meaningfully different configurations
varies from 1.821 to 2.280.
Although the variation between the APFE values
is small, it is of significant utility because the
values of other common statistical measures as
defined by Cares (2005) remain constant between
these configurations. The 42 meaningfully different configurations of a 7-3-7-1 network all
have a link-to-node ratio of 1.556, regardless of
where the links are placed. The characteristic path
length and clustering coefficients are also constant
across every configuration. These metrics can
provide valuable insight regarding large, complex
networks, but cannot discriminate between nearidentical configurations of a smallernetwork, even

Figure 2. An adjacency matrix for one ofthe 42 meaningfully different configurations ofa 7-3-7-1 network

To
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if the only link changed has a significant impact
on the effectiveness of that network.
Identical configurations of the same network
always have the same 11,PFE value, but it is also
possible for meaningfully different configurations
to share the same "-PFE value. In our example, the
42 m eaningfully different configurations of a
7-3-7- i networked force had only 13 unique "-PFE
values. When this occurs, the 11,PFE loses its utility
as an indicator of potential pe1formance between
these configurations. Note that the numbers of
unique APFE values (shown in Table 2 for all X-YX-1 forces where X < 11 and Y < 8) increase at
a significantly smaller rate than the numbers of
meaningfully different combinations (shown in
Table 1). This disparity has a significant impact
on the analysis approach and results.
The initial experiment consisted of all possible
force-on-force engagements of the 42 meaningfully different configurations of two 7-3-7-1
networked forces (BLUE and RED). These configurations had the same numbers of assets but
differed only in the way nodes were connected,
which will enable us to study the impact of connectivity on the network performance. To test the
performance of 1;;ac!! of these 42 configurations
against each other required 1,764 different en-

gagements were required with 30 replications of
the agent-based simulation, each with a random
distribution of the BLUE and RED nodes across
the battlespace. The possible outcomes of each
replicatioa was a BLUE win, a RED win, or an
undecided result.
The results showed that the greater the \,FE
value for either BLUE or RED, the more likely
that force would win the eogagement. This tread
is clear in FigureFigure 3, where the probability
of a BLUE win for any particular configuration
is averaged over all RED configurations. Note
that the vertical groupings reflect those BLUE
configurations that shared each of the 13 unique
11,PFE values. A linear regression model confirms
the visual evidence with a coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.896 for the following equation:
y = l.0162(x) - 1.5780, where y = the average
probability of a BLUE win for that configuration
and x = the 11,PFE value of a configuration.
The correlation between p(Win) and the ~FE
value remains true for the 8-3-8-1 force as well.
Adding just the one Sensor and Influencer increased the number of meaningful combinations
to 78, with 24 unique 11,PFE values, with 6,084 different engagements to be tested (see FigureFigure
4). This linear regression resulted in a coefficient

Table 2. The numbers of unique ,lm: values for the meaningful configurations for all X-Y-X-1 forces
where X < 11 and Y < 8
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win for that configuration and x = the "-PPE value
of a configuration. Note that the highest p(Win)
value does not belong to the configuration with
the higbestAPFE value, indicating that there is some
other correlating factor in effect.
The most significant difference between the
configurations sharing a common "PFE value
concerns the balance of Sensors and Influencers
for each Decider within that configuration. This
balance defines the "robustness" of the configuration, which was a term used by Barabasi (2002)
to describe a network's resilience to failure due
to the loss of some of its nodes. Robustness can
be defined here as the minimum number of nodes
lost that would make the configuration ineffective
(i.e., unable to destroy any more enemy nodes).
Mathematically this can be expressed as: Robustness = [min(S 1,I)] + [min(S 2,12)] + ... + [min(S 0 ,
I)], where S = the number of Sensors assigned
n
"
to Decider n and I n = the number of Influencers
assigned to Decider n.

of determination (R2) equal to 0.876 for the following equation: Y =0.9484(x) - 1.5633, where
y = the average probability of a BLUE win for
that configuration and x = the "PFE value of a
configuration.
The correlation between p(Win) and the \FE
value decreased significru1tly for a 9-5-9-1 force,
however. The additional Sensor, Influencer, and
Decider nodes increased the nwnber of meaningfully different configurations to 95, and resulted in
9,025 different engagements to be tested. Surprisingly, the additional assets reduced the number
of unique "PFE values to 13 (13.68%). Thls is a
dramatic reduction from 30.77% (24 of 78) for
the 8-3-8-1 force, and 30.95% (13 of 42) for the
7-3-7-1 force. The impact of this reduction in
unique APFE values is a greater variety of p(Win)
across for each "PPE value (see FigureFigure 5);
hence the reduction in R2 to a value of 0.519 for
the resulting equation: Y = 0.5861(x) - 0.7736,
where y = the average probability of a BLUE

Figure 3. TheaverageprobabilityofaBLUEwinby).n,for42 configurations ofa 7-3-7-1 BLUE ne-twork
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Figure 4. The average probability ofa BLUE win by J.PFE.Jor 78 configurations ofan 8-3-8-1 BLUE network
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For example, a Decider bas three Sensors
but only one Influencer. This imbalance reduces
the minimum number of nodes that can be lost
before a portion of the force is rendered combat
ineffective (i.e., unable to contribute due to the
lack of combat cycles). If the sole Influencer is
lost, then all three Sensors are combat ineffective
as t.he information collected by the Sensors cannot be acted on. Essentially, the robustness value

reflects the rate of the reduction of the A PFE value
over time. The quicker a force can be rendered
completely ineffective, the lower the robustness
value. Configurations that were more robust
generally had a greater probability of winning,
while less robust configurations generally had a
lower probability of winning (seeFigureFigure 6).
Since the robustness value varied between
configurations sharing the same APFE value it be-

Figure 5. The average probability ofa BLUE win by ).PFEfor 95 configurations ofa 9-5-9-1 BLUE network
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Figure 6. The robustness values of the 95 configurations ofa 9-5-9-1 BLUE network
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came a useful discriminator. For example, 20 of
the 95 configurations of a 9-5-9-1 network share
a "-PFE value of 2.031 , but their robustness values
varied between 6 and 9. Of these 20, only one
configuration had a robustness value of 9, and it
was the one that scored the highest p(Win) value,
0.5425, which was significantly higher than the
other 19 configurations. While there was a strong
correlation between robustness and p(Win), it was
not absolute: 3 ofthe configurations outperformed
others that had a robustness value one greater.
A regression analysis of both the "-PFE value and
the robustness value yields a significant increase
in the coefficient of determination (R2) from a
value of 0.621 to 0.805 and provides the fo1lowing equation: y = [(-0.0307)(x 1) + 0.0615(x..2)]
+ 0.0678, where y = the average probability of
a BLUE win for that configuration, x 1 = the 11.PFE
value of a configuration, and x2 = the robustness
value of a configuration.

APPLICATION FOR PRACTITIONERS
Due to the high costs and high risk of real system
tests, the use of modeling and simulation instead
oflive tests and exercises has been recommended

by Ender et al. (2010) and Garrett et al. (2011).
Although the authors are not aware of any study
on the efficiency of the ballistic missile defense
system based on the principles of IACM, several
studies have been provided that evaluate so called
'kill chains' or 'kill cycles' that have to be established in order to have efficient solutions (Holland and Wallace 2011). This study establishes
a good use case for the approaches discussed in
this chapter.
The challenges to design a reliable and secure
defense system against ballistic missile attacks
have been recognized and evaluated nationally
(Fogleman 1995, Gompert and Isaacson 1999)
as well as internationally (Yost I 982) for more
tbana decade. Recent political changes introduced
additional constraints that require a high degree
of interoperability between the systems and the
detailed integration of command and control
processes (Fruhling and Sinjen 2010).
The general technical challenge remained the
same since described in detail by Weiner (1984).
The overall task is to destroy a hostile ballistic
missile before it hits the target to be protected. To
be able to do this, radars and other sensor means
have to search for threats and detect them. Once
a hostile missile is detected, it needs to be tracked
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and a decision has to be made whether to target
it or not. If the decision is positive, an interceptor has to be launched and guided into the target,
followed an assessment if the engagement was
successful or not.
Radar systems are space based, air based, and
land based, with famous land based radar systems
constructed close to the periphery of the alliance.
The CobraDane Radar in Alaska, the Thule Radar
in Greenland, and the Fylingdales Radar in the
United Kingdom being examples. The US command centers Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) provide
the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Commurucations (C2BMC) for the control. The
interceptors are land-based Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units, sea-based
Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers, and the landbased Patriot systems. Europe, Israel, and Japan
are contributing their own components to support
local concepts. The Missile Defense Agency,
Army, Air Force, and Navy share responsibilities
for operation, management, maintenance, and
ongoing developments.
Holland and Wallace (2011) define a kill
chain as a series combining all six main tasks
to be conducted by the radar system, the control
system, and the missile system. The proposed
chain is displayed in Figure 7.
As identified by Garrett et al. (2011), the ballistic missile defense system is actually a system
of systems in which the various components themselves are systems with established governance
rules and that support the common objective of
missile defense, but that are operationally independent. Overall, they fulfill the distinguishing

characteristics compiled by Tolk, Adams, and
Keating (2011):
•
•
•
•
•

Operational independence of the systems,
Managerial independence of the systems,
Geographic <listribution,
Emergent behavior,
Evolutionary development.

To establish a kill chain, components providing
radar functionality to search and detect, control
functionality to track, target, and assess, and missile functionality to engage are required to be interconnected via interoperable interfaces. Holland
and Wallace (2011) identify scenario graphs to
address what they refer to as integration readiness
level: are the various components able to connect
with each other in order to establish a kill chain,
and are there redundancies to increase the stability
of the ballistic missile defense operation. They
use correspon<ling adjacency matrix.es to identify
which radar system connects with which control
systems and which missile system.
This motivates, however, to map the ballistic
missile defense components to the IACM components, eventually adding some extensions as
discussed before: The hostile ballistic missile is
the target T, the sensor provides the radar functionalities S, the decision nodes model the control
functionalities, and the engaging interceptor missile system represents the influencer. The IACM
interpretation of the kill chain is shown in the
following figure.
This interpretation allows to apply the IACM
insights described before to evaluate effectiveness
and efficiency of the ballistic missile defense
system. If each likely attack must be met by at

Figure 7. Kill Chain for the Ballistic Missile Defense System
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Figure 8. !ACM fnte,pretation of the kill chain
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least one kill chain. However, each additional kill
chain increases the likelihood of a defense success, and the more kill chains can cover a target,
the higher the defense success gets. The number
of possible kill chains, however, can be captured
by computing the eigenvalue "PPE of the resulting
adjacency matrix resulting from the interpretation
of interoperable components within the IACM.
The engagement step itself must also be interpreted as a kill cycle within the IACM. An
interceptor fire unit comprises its own command
and control center (D), a fire control radar (S),
and the interceptor missile (I) to engage a hostile
ballistic missile (T). In particular in combined
operations in which several nations are fighting
within a coalition, mutual support - like easily
possible between two Aegis cruisers or two Patriot systems - is not the rule. The Israeli Arrow
Weapon System, e.g., can be integrated into the
kill chain using the C2BMC, but in the engage-

ment cycle itself the fire unit components are not
interchangeable, which is often a problem between
services and sometimes even within the services
as well. The kill cycle for the engagement step
maps one-to-one to the basic combat cycle shown
in FigureFigure 1 in the beginning of the chapter,
although it should be pointed out that the tracking
of the hostile ballistic missile by the fire control
radar is a process, not an event. For high-level
analysis as targeted within most contributions to
this book, this level of detail is often negligible
and it can be assumed that each fire unit can and
will operate independently. Cross fire unit support
can only increase the overall efficiency and has
no negative effects on the overall performance of
ballistic missile defense.
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CONCLUSION
As recommended in the NATO Code of Best
Practice for C2 Assessment (2002), the use of
an orchestrated set of tools and methods is best
practice when addressing complex questions like
this one. The benefit ofIACM based sceriarios is
that they allow us to analyze a broad volume of
the solution space to identify a smaller fraction
of particular interest. This smaller area can then
be evaluated using detailed simulation systems,
such as described by Lynch, Diallo, and Tolle
(2013), which is based on the concepts theoretically introduced by Garrett et al. (2011).
The application of the IACM also shifts the
focus of the assessment of a networked force from
the capabilities ofthe nodes (generic in the IACM)
to the capability of the network as a whole. The
results of the agent-based simulation indicated that
the value ofthe APFE was a significant measurement
of the performance of a networked force. We also
learned that the APFE value alone was insufficient
indicator when the ratio of unique APffi values for
the configurations under consideration decreased.
Other quantifiable network rr.e!rics, such as the
link-to-node ratio, degree distribution, clusted..il~
coefficient, and characteristic path length, were
unable to consistently discriminate between these
configurations thatdiffered by a single link, regardless of the significance of that link. The addition
of a robustness factor was necessary to aid in
predicting the network performance. By utilizing
both the "-PFE value and the robustness value, the
coefficient of determination for the numerous
configurations ofthree different networked forces
showed a strong degree of correlation with the
average probability of a Win.
We expect that these results will apply to even
larger networks as well given that the only difference in the context of the IACM is a larger, possibly
much larger, adjacency matrix. The mathematics
of the application of graph theory remain the same.
It is possible, however, that larger networks may

188

have a smaller ratio of unique APFE values. If so,
the consideration of the robustness factor along
with the 11,PFE value becomes even more necessary.
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APPENDIX
Questions

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
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What other connectivity measures for matrices could be applied?
How will this observation change if connections are no longer sure (p=l .0) but only likely (0 < p
< 1), e.g. when detection probabilities or communication probabilities are modeled in the IACM?
Can Kill Chains as described for the BDMS example be expressed in form of matrices?
Can we determine the value of a Sensor relative to an Influencer?
How many assets can organizational optimization offset (i.e. a smaller, more optimally organized
force defeating a larger force)?
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